“Woman, life, freedom”: A revolutionary movement in historical perspective

The Constitutionalist Revolution

In the late 19th century, Iranian society suffered both from the arbitrary rule of the Qajar dynasty and the colonial penetration by the United Kingdom and Russia. There are some indications, that gender dichotomy as well as homophobia in Iran originated rather from British Victorianism than Persian/Islamic culture, as Najmabadi describes in her 2005 work Women with mustaches and men without beards. Patriarchy was well-established in pre-colonial Iran and is generally known as a basic trait of all Abrahamic religions. Furthermore, social relations were shaped by different forms of discrimination. For instance, lower classes had to live with humiliation on a daily basis; women suffered from cemented patriarchal relations; and Baha’is were stigmatized and pursued because of their faith.

As the extravagant life of the monarch plundered the treasury, he gave economic concessions to foreign companies. The tough life conditions finally triggered a series of events that led in 1905/1906 to the Mashruteh (Constitutionalist) Revolution. The power of the monarch was thus reduced to a ceremonial one by a constitution that was based on the Belgian Constitution with some adaptations to the Islamic norms. The new constitution was in many aspects very progressive. However, despite their considerable contribution to the victory of the Revolution, women were left out in the articles regarding voting rights.

Although the newly won democracy suffered from a setback as the Russians intervened militarily in 1908 and reinstalled the absolutist monarchy, in 1914 the revolutionaries succeeded in reviving the democracy. However, the occupation of Iran during WWI by Russian, British and Ottoman forces created chaotic conditions. A de-railed economy, exploitation of the foodstuffs by the occupying armies and successive seasonal droughts led to the worst famine Iran had experienced in centuries. The great famine of Iran is unfortunately under-researched. It can, however, be assumed that women as housewives went through hell to prepare some food for the family.  A substantial part of the population perished.

Authoritarian Modernization

Given these dire circumstances, it is no wonder that the seizure of power by the disciplined and visionary General of the Iranian Cossack Brigade, Reza Khan, in 1921 was seen by many Iranians as a salvation. Having secured the country and its borders, Reza Khan (1878-1944) maximized his grip on power by founding in 1925 the new Pahlavi dynasty and enthroning himself as the new king, Reza Shah. He could now accelerate the modernization of the country with an iron fist. Similar to Ata Turk, he also secularized the country by pushing back against the clergy and de-veiling women. These moves, however, offended the religious sentiments of the public and cost him popularity. Unpopular were also his utterly undemocratic rule and his disregard for the constitution.

A democratic intermezzo

In 1941, the Allied Forces occupied Iran, ousted the king, who had sought good relations with Germany, and replaced him by his liberal-minded son Mohammad Reza Shah (1919-80). The new liberal era gave both the clergy and the political forces a new life. Soon, the nationalist forces coalesced around the National Front, led by the visionary jurist Mohammad Mosaddegh (1882-1967), to nationalize the Iranian oil industry.

Shocked by this move, the British government first tried to undermine Mosaddegh’s administration (1951-53) by sanctions and sea blockades. Finally, Mosaddegh was removed from power in a coup launched by the British and the US secret services. Although Mosaddegh’s rule was abruptly terminated after less than two and half years, his achievements in the democratization of the country, rule of law and enforcement of the national interests of Iran are up to date remembered with awe and admiration.

Authoritarian Modernization 2.0

After the coup, the monarch turned into an authoritarian ruler resuming the modernization program of his father. However, his achievements were always overshadowed by his approval of the anti-Mosaddegh coup, his undemocratic rule, and his disregard for human rights. Besides, his modernist agenda provoked resistance among the re-energized clergy. In the early 1960s, as the king launched a land and other social reforms (including voting rights for women), the clergy took to the streets. The regime reacted with a harsh crackdown. The leader of the movement, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-89), was deported to Turkey.

Political radicalism

The rapid modernization of the country was very disruptive and therefore accompanied by a series of social crises. For instance, an underdeveloped infrastructure could not keep pace with modern patterns of consumption. Jammed streets, power shortages, lack of technicians, and poor quality domestic production were the result. Furthermore, sociocultural modernization and underdeveloped political institutions were an explosive mixture, as Milani points out in his 2011 work The Shah. The expansion of tertiary education created masses of politically conscious students who demanded civil rights. Add to this all radical impulses from the world society, especially from leftist guerilla movements in Europe, Latin America, Algeria, Vietnam, etc., etc. An interplay of these factors made the Iranian youth highly receptive to radical ideologies. A revolutionary reading of Islam brought the religion also into the arena of political radicalism.

Amid such tensions, a slight political opening by the monarch in 1977 unleashed a trajectory that grew soon into a revolutionary movement. The charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini managed from exile to take over the leadership of the movement. His anti-monarchic and anti-imperialist slogans were music in the ears of the radicalized youth. Populist as he was, he could masterfully mobilize all social groups and classes in the country for his cause to replace the monarchy with an “Islamic Republic”. In early 1979 the monarchy was toppled and Khomeini took the power.

The victory of the revolution was, among others, due to the wide-scale contribution of women. Even though the Pahlavi regime had remarkably improved the legal and social status of women and enabled them to participate in public life, it had difficulties in winning over their hearts. While modern women had primarily political grievances, the traditional women regarded the increasing Westernization of the country as a threat to their religious and traditional values. Even though the Islamists very soon started pushing through a patriarchal agenda, the women were split in their reactions. While secular women started to resist these policies, the traditional and Islamist women rejoiced their participation in public life that in their eyes was now “cleansed” from “immoral” Western influence.

Islamic reformism

Waken up to a new authoritarian rule far away from their ideals of a free and equal society, many political groups and parties took to the streets to resist the increasing dominance of the Islamists. The regime reacted with repression and managed to destroy all oppositional groups.

As I explored in a 2017 article, in the 1990s, in the absence of political parties and ideologies, Iranians began from scratch to organize resistance to the Islamists’ totalitarian rule. The leaders of this movement were mostly ex-Islamist intellectuals who believed that the policies of the regime were in gross violation of the emancipative goals of the Islamic Revolution. They advocated therefore a reforming, rather than an overthrow, of the system.

A major driving force in the reformist movement were women, many of them ex-Islamists, who over time had realized how discriminatory the gender policies of the Islamist regime were. Some of the activists even demanded a feminist reading of the Quran.
Islamic reformists were soon so popular that they could propel their candidates in four elections into the presidency (Mohammad Khatami 1997-2001 and 2001-2005; Hassan Rouhani 2013-2017 and 2017-2021). While Khatami focused during his presidency on the establishment of rule of law and protection of individual liberties, Rouhani was determined to boost the economy by reaching an atomic deal with the P5+1 countries (the UN Security Council’s five permanent members plus Germany). Both presidents were, however, largely paralyzed due to the resistance and chicanery of the hardliners as well as the US sanctions.

Inspired by the so-called “color revolutions”, the reformists launched, in the 2009 presidential elections, the “Green Movement” to put an end to tyranny and corruption. As their nominee, Mirhossein Mousavi, was allegedly beaten by the populist hardliner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, they took to the streets in millions chanting the slogan “where is my vote?”. The regime reacted with a brutal crackdown by shooting at the demonstrators, jailing thousands of protesters, giving heavy sentences for made-up offenses, etc.

The hardliners’ totalitarianism as well as their constant efforts to block the policies of the reformist administrations led to the erosion of hopes that the regime could ever be reformed. The deterioration of the economy, dramatically aggravated by the unilateral withdrawal of the US under Donald Trump from the JCPOA agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – an unclear agreement to ensure the Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful), further damaged the reformists’ cause. Finally, the highly manipulated parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively in 2020 and 2021, were the proverbial last straw for Islamic reformism.

Calls for a regime change

In 2017, protests against the costs of living captured the whole country like wildfire. This time around, the slogans were addressed against the whole regime and its leadership. In 2019, a similar uprising was sparked by the sharp increase in gasoline prices. Both movements were repressed, leaving hundreds dead and many more hundreds injured. In both movements, the lower social classes were in the lead. In 2021 and 2022 several other protests could be observed by farmers, teachers, workers, bus drivers, and the retired either against water scarcity, unpaid salaries, insufficient pensions or other shortcomings.

On 16 September 2022, the 22-year-old Iranian Kurdish woman Mahsa Jina Amini died after being arrested by the Iranian morality police (Gasht-e Ershad, “Guidance Patrol”) for not having worn the hijab properly. Gasht-e Ershad is theoretically responsible for the enforcement of decency of appearance in the public, independent of gender. However, in practice, it has been almost exclusively focused on enforcing women’s hijab.
Mahsa’s death triggered a protest movement that soon captured the whole country. The tragic event outraged young women the most because they knew from their own daily lives how humiliating and dangerous an encounter with the morality police was, especially since the Islamists cast the hijab as a symbol of their supremacy. By burning their headscarves and cutting their hair publicly, young women challenged this very hegemony. The regime reactivated its repression mode, thus pouring fuel on the fire. The movement soon arrived the schools animating the schoolchildren to tear pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei, chant revolutionary slogans and wave their headscarves in the air.

Even though this movement is very dynamic, so far it shows the following characteristics:

• It is spearheaded by the youth, primarily young women, whose cosmopolitan tendencies are at odds with the Islamist ideology.
• It has surpassed reformism and is focused on the overthrow of the regime.
• It integrates different ethnic groups, social classes and age groups.
• It has unified Iranians in the country and abroad.
• It is based on a broad consensus that the future Iranian regime should be democratic, pluralistic and secular.

A final note: The Iranian youth’s resentments should by no means be reduced to the state’s control over their bodies. Numerous hardships such as the dire economic conditions that cut into the everyday lives of the youth and even hamper their chances to marry, a bleak perspective, risks of having a love relationship, not to mention same-sex love, scarce leisure time activities, deterioration of the nature, severe shortcomings of the public health, etc., etc. have made the lives of the youth unbearable. In his 2017 publication, Khosravi goes into detail to show how precarious the lives of young Iranians have become. He even cites a woman who says: “We don’t live. We are the walking dead” (p. 226). Iranian youth’s grievances are astonishingly well captured by Shervin Hajatpoor’s song “baray-e” (for/because of) which has been described by many as the manifesto of the revolution. All these problems show that the revolutionary movement has considerable potential to continue and grow further.

Bibliography

Khosravi, Shahram (2017). Precarious Lives: Waiting and Hope in Iran. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Pres.

Milani, Abbas (2011). The Shah. New York: palgrave macmillan.

Najmabadi, Afsaneh (2005). Women with mustaches and men without beards. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sheikhzadegan, Amir (2017). The trajectory of the 1953 military coup and the course of liberal Islam in Iran: A sociological analysis. In: Sheikhzadegan, Amir and Astrid Meier (eds.). Beyond the Islamic Revolution: Perceptions of Modernity and Tradition in Iran before and after 1979 (pp. 31-59). Berlin: De Gruyter.