Problematization, Subject-Construction and Epistemic Injustice

In “Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition”, Mari J. Matsuda (1991) reflects on working in coalition. She asks herself, as many do, whether working in coalition is worth it. To this, Matsuda answers in the affirmative. In this exploration, she argues that standing in solidarity, in coalition, is necessary because all forms of subordination are connected. To understand the way in which they are connected, she poses a method she calls “ask the other question”. In this method of asking the other question, one can show how all forms of domination and subordination are interrelated, co-constitutive. If a situation seems racist, Matsuda says, she asks “Where is the patriarchy in this?” (1189). Correspondingly, if something looks homophobic, she asks “Where are the class interests in this?” (1189). This is an informative method—a method that asks us to remain curious, to have a holistic view of subordination and to constantly remind us that there is always another side to things.

When reading Anukriti Dixit (2024)’s recent book “Anti-Sexual Harassment Laws in India: Problematizing Caste(d), Postcolonial and Neoliberal Policies”, I was reminded of Mari J. Matsuda’s method. These core tenants—of being curious, of looking at things from a different perspective, of asking the other question—are also fundamental to Dixit’s approach. Central to it is the concept of problematization, or, more specifically, asking which problems are created through discourse, asking the question of “what’s the problem represented to be” (WPR). Dixit takes this approach and applies it to her field of research, sexual harassment in the workplace (SHW) in India. She questions the different ways in which SHW is conceptualized, problematized, which kind of problem it is portrayed to be. Among other aspects, she specifically pays attention to the role that caste plays here, as this dimension is often ignored. This again shows her commitment to asking the other question. In the book, in three different sections, she discusses three different problematizations of SHW: as a problem of outraging modesty, as a problem of sex-based discrimination and as a problem of employment relations. In all three of these problematizations, Dixit traces how these discourses create certain subjects—those who can appeal to these discourses, and those who are not considered in them—and the way in which all these subjects are constrained by them. In the chapter on modesty, Dixit traces how subjects of modesty are created, and therefore how the victim of sexual harassment in the workplace needs to be perceived as modest first, to be able to receive any kind of justice or compensation. In the chapter that follows, on sex-based discrimination, Dixit shows again how the appeal to sex constructs certain subjects that can be sexually harassed, in this conception, and others that cannot, by virtue of this conceptualization. Similarly, in the chapter on employment relations, Dixit tracks the way in which the workplace is shaped in this discourse, and again, how it excludes certain subjects from appealing to legislation surrounding it. In the last two chapters of the book, Dixit delves deeper into subject construction generally, within these discourses, and engages in self-problematization.

There are many ways in which this book persuades—from the very thorough empirical work to the excellent self-problematization—but for me it is the analysis of subject-construction through legal discourse where Dixit shines the brightest. This is especially apparent and effective in chapter two of the book “The ‘Problem’ of SHW as Outraging of Modesty: Subjects of ‘Honour’”, where, as stated above, Dixit analyses the ways in which modest subject-positions are created. Subjects and subject-positions, then, are constructed and embedded in the very regimes of problematization that Dixit examines. A poignant example of this is the creation of an “unrapable” subject. Because laws that are used to deal with SHW appeal to a woman’s (for further analysis of the importance of the category of woman here, chapter three is especially relevant) modesty, she first must prove that she is modest. In this sense, to be modest, is not to be raped, to be chaste, to be honorable. Therefore, she cannot report crimes of sexual nature, as this would go against her image as a modest, honorable woman. It is because of this that she is, on one hand, “unrapable”—she is a modest woman who does not figure in the realm of sexual “deviancy”—but on the other infinitely “rapable”—as she, by virtue of being a modest woman, cannot ever report it. This places those facing SHW in pernicious double binds, producing a very specific kind of vulnerability. This is just one of the examples of Dixit’s excellent analyses of this kind of problematization, legal discourse, and the subsequent construction of subject-positions.

Another aspect of the book that struck me as especially relevant and important was the engagement with the field of epistemic injustice, which deals with the ways in which communication is constrained by existing power relations. There are several especially significant interventions made by Dixit. I find her focus on the law and therefore institutions and institutionalization to be especially interesting. Institutions are not always considered in discussions of epistemic injustice, and the shared pool of hermeneutical resources—concepts, words, systems of thought— is often taken for granted as existing between individuals, not mediated by these institutions. However, Dixit’s work shows the role that institutions play in the distribution of hermeneutical resources, and that they create environments in which certain resources are more or less accessible for people to use to describe and make sense of their experiences. This part of the analysis is made possible by the fluid conception of power that Dixit employs—drawing from a Foucauldian framework. It is within this conception of power, a power that is pervasive, that shapes discourse and is shaped by discourse, that Dixit can analyze the regimes of problematization and therefore give due attention to certain institutions and institutionalizations. It is also this conception of power that allows Dixit to move away from the progress narrative that is often presumed in discussions on epistemic injustice. A common conception seems to be that epistemic justice can be achieved by better distribution of hermeneutical and epistemic resources, that people can awaken from their so-called “epistemic slumbers” (see for example Medina (2023), chapter two). However, as is made clear in this book, all the relevant (epistemic) resources might be available, and justice still might not be achieved. Subsequently, anti-sexual harassment laws might be in place and still not be effective in achieving justice and might actually—as is shown here—disadvantage the most vulnerable members of society. I think this is very fertile ground of discussion and I only hope that Dixit engages more with this field, as I feel these interventions are very much needed.  

In conclusion then, I think this is a very thorough problematization of the way SHW is problematized in India, that is relevant for a much broader context and field. It is a valuable contribution to the field, specifically to the method of WPR, but also for other fields, such as the field of epistemic injustice. It is a multifaceted book that is a worthwhile read for anyone engaging with either sexual harassment policy, subject-construction, problematization or epistemic injustice, or anyone who is just ready to “ask the other question”.

References:

• Dixit, Anukriti. 2024. Anti-Sexual Harassment Laws in India. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-73653-7.
• Matsuda, Mari J. 1991. “Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition.”Stanford Law Review 43 (6): 1183–92.
• Medina, José. 2023. The Epistemology of Protest. Oxford: Oxford University Press.